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THE SOVIET VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
O.J. Lissitzyn 
When we begin the study of intern a-
tionallaw, we soon come to realize that 
it is, indeed, a useful instrument in our 
relations with many other states. But 
the question probably arises in the 
minds of most of you: Does it do any 
good at all to talk about international 
law when it comes to dealing with the 
Soviet Union and its allies? Can we 
expect them to pay heed to any rules of 
international law, or to carry out any 
obligations that they may assume? 
Indeed, is there anything in common in 
their attitude toward international law 
and ours? Or is the gap so great that 
there is no place at all for international 
law in the relations between the two 
sides in the cold war? Sometimes one 
encounters extreme views on these ques-
tions. On one hand, some people seem 
to assume that there is no significant 
difference between the Soviet and the 
Western attitudes-that we can expect 
international law to operate in the 
relations between the Soviet Union and 
other countries pretty much the same as 
it operates in the relations of the non-
communist states among themselves. 
This is perhaps more commonly encoun-
tered nowadays in foreign countries, 
especially the so-called neutralist na-
tions, than it is in the United States. At 
the other extreme there is the view, 
perhaps more commonly held in the 
United States, that international law is 
virtually irrelevant to our relations with 
the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc in 
general. Sometimes this view takes the 
form of denial of a universal interna-
tional law which is binding on both 
sides in the cold war. Sometimes this 
view is associated with the impression 
that the Soviets are either completely 
ignorant, or completely contemptuous 
of international law. There is also the 
notion that the Soviet Union can never 
be expected to comply with interna-
tional law except when it is to their 
advantage to do so, while in the West, 
particularly in the United States, inter-
national law is always obeyed. I suggest 
that the truth, as is often the case, is 
somewhere between these two extreme 
views. 
At this point perhaps we might 
digress a little and ask ourselves; What 
do we mean by universality of a system 
such as the system of international law? 
Let me suggest that there are three 
different levels at which we can discuss 
universality in connection with interna-
tional law. First, the verbal level; 
second, the level of action; and third, 
the level of motivation. Let me speak 
about the specific attitudes on each of 
these levels. 
Now on the verbal level-that is, the 
level of words-the Soviets purport to 
accept the existence and binding force 
of international law in the relations 
between the communist and the non-
communist world. As a matter of fact, 
they make it a point in public pro-
nouncements to stress international law 
and its study. As far baek as Oetober 5, 
1946, shortly after the end of the 
Second World War, the Central Com-
mittee of the All-Union Communist 
Party directed that special attention be 
given to the study of international law 
in their institutions of higher learning, 
and indeed, international law courses 
are given by many Soviet university law 
faculties. 
There is a growing flood of Soviet 
publications on international law, in-
cluding textbooks, books of colleetions 
of documents and other source ma-
terials, monographs on many specialized 
aspects of international law, and numer-
ous articles in periodicals. Sometimes in 
these writings, international law is said 
to be "an attribute of culture and 
civilization" and an indispensable condi-
tion of modern international relations. 
Four years ago a Soviet Association of 
International Law was set up which 
became a branch of the worldwide 
International Law Association and 
which publishes a Soviet yearbook of 
international law. The president of this 
association, Professor Gregory Tunkin, 
is also legal adviser of the Soviet Foreign 
Office. Three years ago he gave some 
lectures in English at the Hague 
Academy of International Law in the 
Netherlands, in which he stressed the 
relation of international law to peaceful 
coexistence. Tunkin is probably today 
the leading Soviet authority in the field 
of international law, and he is a very 
intelligent man. He speaks well and 
presents the Soviet point of view with 
relative moderation and in terms which 
do not always seem to be too different 
from our traditional Western terms. 
Nevertheless, as I shall point out later, 
he, too, like all other Soviet writers and 
speakers, while stressing the importance 
and universality of international law, 
finds it necessary and desirable to point 
out certain special attitudes and ap-
proaches. International law is very 
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frequently appealed to by the Soviet 
Union in diplomatic notes, in debates at 
international conferences, and especially 
in the United Nations. As a matter of 
fact, I am told by people who have been 
close observers of what is going on in 
the United Nations, that the Soviet 
representatives are perhaps more and 
more stressing legal arguments, and are 
gaining some attention, especially from 
people coming from the so-called un-
committed or neutralist nations, or the 
new nations. 
International law is also mentioned 
in Soviet legislation. Finally, I will 
conclude by quoting Khrushchev him-
self. Just before he came to the United 
States in 1959 to see President Eisen-
hower and to make a tour of our 
country, he said, in a domestic speech: 
"We are well aware that without observ-
ance of the standards of international 
law, and without the fulfillment of the 
undertakings assumed in relations be-
tween states, there can be no trust, and 
without trust there can be no peaceful 
co-existence." Well, so far so good. It 
seems that the Soviets, at least on the 
verbal level, accept the binding force of 
international law, its reality and its 
importance; but even on this verbal level 
this acceptance is not unqualified. All 
through the Soviet writings runs the 
thread of a claim of the right to reject 
any part of international law which does 
not fit in with Soviet policy. This was 
perhaps most boldly stated by Professor 
Kozhevnikov, who later became, and 
was for several years, the Soviet Judge 
of the International Court of Justice. In 
a book written in 1948 called The 
Soviet State and International Law, 
which was perhaps the most representa-
tive and most outspoken book on inter-
national law written by a Soviet profes-
sor in the late Stalin period, he said, 
"Those institutions of international law 
which can facilitate the execution of the 
stated tasks of the USSR are recognized 
and applied by the USSR, and those 
institutions which conflict in any 
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manner with these purposes are rejected 
by the USSR." 
Now, other Soviet writers rarely put 
it in quite this blunt fashion, especially 
since the death of Stalin, when there has 
been a certain note of moderation in 
some of the writings. This claim is put 
in much milder terms. But basically 
there seems to be very little difference 
between what Kozhevnikov said, and 
what was said in 1958 in the Hague 
lecture by Tunkin, whom I have alrea.dy 
mentioned as the legal adviser to the 
Soviet Foreign Office, and one of the 
most prominent of the Soviet interna-
tional lawyers. Now as I said, Tunkin 
speaks in a voice of relative moderation 
and in terms which don't sound too 
strange to Western ears, but what he 
said about international law and co-
existence was substantially this: (I have 
no convenient quotation here.) He 
spoke of the international 'law of our 
times as resting on agreement of two 
sides in the cold war. He even called it, 
in a section heading of his lectures as 
printed, "the new doctrine of agree-
ment" What it amounts to is that only 
those rules are binding on the Soviet 
Union, and also on the noncommunist 
nations, which are accepted by both, 
either through express agreement, that 
is, by treaties, or by tacit agreement, 
that is, customary international law. In 
this connection, I may add that Soviet 
writers generally regard treaties as the 
most important source of international 
law; they admit that customary ihterna-
tional law exists, and that custom is a 
source of law, but they stress that in 
modern times treaties are more im-
portant This, of course, happens to 
coincide with Soviet interest, since cus-
tomary law-large parts of it-was estab-
lished long before the communist 
regime in Russia came into existence. 
There is little the Soviets can do about 
changing these customs. Sometimes 
they have a chance to make a change or 
to throw their weight in the direction of 
a change which they desire, of course, 
but nevertheless much of the customary 
international law is old and they didn't 
have anything to say about its coming 
into being. Treaties are something which 
they can agree to or not agree to, and if 
there is a treaty they don't want to 
agree to, well, it's not binding on them. 
So they prefer to deal with international 
law primarily in terms of treaties which 
are expressly agreed upon. So then, the 
Soviet writers bluntly or more mildly 
say that the Soviet Union may reject 
certain parts of international law and 
that it is bound only by those parts 
which it accepts. I must point out, 
however, that in fact Soviet writers 
specify very few rules which they reject. 
As a matter of fact, some parts of the 
standard text used in Soviet universities 
on international law sound rather like 
recitals of rules which are well known in 
the West, and there is nothing new. 
Some other parts, to be sure, do present 
new points of view. Of course, there are 
certain rules which the Soviets interpret 
in a way different from the interpreta-
tion given the same rules by the United 
States: for example, this is true of the 
rules concerning the width of territorial 
waters, certain rules concerning the 
sovereign immunity of states, and so on. 
Differences in interpretation of rules of 
international law, of course, are not 
new, and such differences exist among 
noncommunist countries. They existed 
long before the communist regimes 
appeared, so that in itself, they are not 
terribly significant. 
There's another point, however, 
which is made by some Soviet writers; 
not as constantly as the point about 
accepting or rejecting certain parts of 
international law, but nevertheless, it's a 
point well worth mentioning because it 
coincides with certain doctrines in the 
field of politics and history. Shurshalov, 
who is a young Soviet writer on the law 
of treaties, has emphasized in one of his 
books that treaties are valid only so long 
as the objective historical conditions in 
which they were made continue to 
exist. There are some hints of the same 
doctrine being extended not only to 
treaties, but to customary rules. In 
other words, history, according to this 
view, is not static; it's dynamic; it's 
moving; it's developing; what may be 
good today may become obsolete 
tomorrow, and this, as I shall point out 
later, reflects the basic Soviet interpreta-
tion that the history of our times has 
changed in the direction of greater 
power being developed and exercised by 
the communist governments. But this 
doctrine that Shurshalov advocates, of 
course, does suggest that not only are 
they free to accept or reject interna-
tional law at the starting point, but that 
they may later say, "Ah, we accepted 
this rule, yes, but the objective condi-
tions of historical development have 
now made this rule obsolete. " 
Another point on which they depart, 
even in words, from universality is that 
they do claim that not only can they 
reject those rules which they don't like, 
but they also claim and take pride in 
claiming that they have been instru-
mental in introducing new principles 
into international law; for instance, such 
principles as self-determination, non-
aggression and nonintervention. They 
point to earlier Soviet pronouncements 
immediately after the October Revolu-
tion, in which these principles were 
proclaimed to the world, and they say 
that these are now accepted, or on the 
way to being accepted, universally. You, 
of course, wonder if they themselves 
livc up to these principles, and this I will 
mention later on. 
Also, there is the claim that a new 
socialist international law is being 
created in the relations between the 
socialist states, so·called-the states 
ruled by the Communist Party-but 
when it comes to specific details of this 
new socialist international law, they are 
rather vague, and, as a matter of fact, if 
one looks at treaties between members 
of the Soviet bloc, one often finds an 
amazing similarity between such treaties 
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and treaties between Western states; for 
instance, treaties on the status of forces 
-that is, on jurisdiction over members 
of foreign armed forces stationed in a 
country. As we know, we have many 
such agreements, the most important of 
which is the NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement. The Soviets have troops 
stationed in certain European countries, 
and they have also made agreements 
which in large part seem to be almost 
copied from ours. There are some differ-
enees, but the treaties are amazingly 
similar. The same is true of some trea-
ties on consular relations between com-
munist states. 
So, on this matter of new socialist 
international law emerging in the rela-
tions between the socialist states, it is a 
little unclear just what is new, although 
they sometimes stress the principle of 
proletarian solidarity, proletarian inter-
nationalism, etc. But these sound more 
like political, rather than legal prin-
ciples. And even though they do claim, 
with some pride, that they are devel-
oping this new socialist international 
law, they, however, hasten to reaffirm 
that this does not mean that there is no 
universal international law. They say, 
"Yes, we have certain new principles in 
relations with socialist states, but that 
does not mean that there is no body of 
rules binding on all states-capitalist and 
communist as well. " 
So on the verbal level they do recog-
nize, or are forced to admit, the uni-
versality of international law. Well, what 
about the second level, the level of 
action? Do they actually follow interna-
tional law, or do they completely ignore 
it? Now at this point I would like to 
digress again and say that in general any 
kind of relations between two or more 
nation-states would be impossible with-
out some mutually recognized rules of 
behavior, recognized not only verbally, 
but on the level of action. So long as 
both sides desire to have some kind of 
relations, the sanction for the non-
observance of the rules governing such 
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relations is the impairment of the rela-
tions and of the advantages of such 
relations. For instance, take the most 
elementary example: both the Soviet 
Union and the United States at present 
choose to maintain diplomatic relations 
with each other. We have an embassy in 
Moscow; they have an embassy in Wash-
ington, and the same, of course, is true 
not only of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, but many other so-called 
capitalist countries and the Soviet 
Union. On the other hand, we do not 
choose to maintain diplomatic relations 
with communist China; there is a differ-
ence here. But so long as we do choose 
to maintain diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union, and so long as this 
desire is reciprocal, relations are main-
tained. But in order to have diplomatic 
relations, you have to have some mini-
mal rules about the people who are 
diplomats. These are the rules which are 
commonly called diplomatic privileges 
and immunities. You couldn't carry on 
diplomatic relations on a fairly regular, 
functioning basis if rules of diplomatic 
immunity were completely disregarded. 
And so, we do find that in the relations 
between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, diplomatic immunities, 
although occasionally disregarded, or 
ocassionally argued about in specific 
situations or incidents, are by and large, 
observed on the level of action, as well 
as the level of words. 
There are certain other areas of 
international law in which this is largely 
true although there are always some 
qualifications and exceptions. It is 
largely true of the freedom of the seas. 
As Admiral Mott said yesterday, there 
may be a Contingent Plan for certain 
reprisals against the Soviet Union in case 
it starts a blockade of Berlin or mis-
behaves in some other fashion. But so 
long as it doesn't do so we generally 
respect its rights to navigate the high 
seas, to fly over the high seas, and again 
there is reciprocity. But you might say, 
"Well, what about the RB-47?" This is 
one of the exceptions that I have in 
mind. But, as Admiral Mott pointed 
out, if and when we do have some kind 
of a pacific blockade, or whatever you 
call it, whereby we would try to inter-
rupt the shipping of the Soviet Union, it 
might quickly become a kind of a 
limited naval war, which in turn might 
turn into or degenerate into an all-out 
war. But so long as we don't want that 
to happen, and we have no specific 
reason for denying freedom of the seas 
to them and vice versa, we continue bv 
and large to observe the freedom of th~ 
seas, and in this case when I say we I 
mean both sides. 
There are certain other fields. There 
is the field of trade, of communications. 
You can send a letter to Moscow by 
ordinary mail and get a reply by ordi-
nary mail, etc. The Soviet Union partici-
pates in a number of agreements for the 
conservation of maritime resources: 
whales, fish, etc. There is a large number 
of areas which I could go on enumer-
ating, in which there is an actual "give 
and take" and a reasonable amount of 
co-operation and observance of interna-
tional law between the two sides. The 
Soviet Union has been a party to some 
3,000 multilateral and bilateral treaties 
over the course of its existence. The 
United States and the Soviet Union 
today are both parties to some 70 
multilateral treaties, and, of course, we 
have also some bilateral agreements. The 
Soviet Union takes an active part in 
conferences designed to develop and 
codify certain parts of international law, 
protecting, of course, its own interests. 
A conference on the law of the sea 
which was held in Geneva in 1958, and 
which developed the four conventions 
on the law of the sea, witnessed a very 
active participation by the Soviet Union 
and the bloc countries, and the product 
of the conference, the four conventions, 
have certain marks on them of this 
participation. The Soviet Union partici-
pated again in 1960 in another con-
ference on the law of the sea, which 
failed to reach an agreement because the 
Soviet, among other states, insisted on 
rejecting the 3-mile limit and also a 
compromise solution that the United 
States supported, a 6-mile limit for 
fishing purposes. 
Last spring, both the Soviet Union 
and the United States, as well as most 
other nations of the world, participated 
in a conference to codify the law of 
diplomatic privileges and immunities, 
which was held in Vienna and which 
produced a convention, which the 
United States has signed. And here 
again, on this level of making of new 
conventions on international law, the 
Soviet Union participates. Of course, it 
goes without saying that violations of 
international law, of treaties as well as 
customary international law, by the 
Soviet Union, have been numerous. A 
statistical compilation would probably 
be impossible and meaningless, because 
it is not only a matter of counting 
specific violations, which is difficult 
enough in itself, but is also a matter of 
their relative significance or importance. 
It would be, of course, a distortion of 
reality, to say that only the Soviet 
Union violates international law, while 
the Western nations never do. It is well 
known that international law through-
out its existence for some 300 or 400 
years has been violated by various na-
tions. Here again, it cannot be said that 
you can put down in some sort of table 
all the numerouS violations. It would be 
impossible to compile such a table. Of 
course, it has always been recognized 
that the observance of international law 
has been far from perfect. Nevertheless, 
the Soviet conduct in this respect has 
given the widespread impression, which 
is probably justified, that violations of 
international law by the Soviet Union 
are particularly frequent and particu-
larly threatening to the maintenance of 
international stability. This impression 
has been reinforced by the Soviet resort 
to international law as a propaganda 
slogan or a set of slogans such as 
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se If-de termination, nonintervention, 
nonaggression, sovereignty, and 
equality. Now, these slogans appeal; 
they appeal especially to the smaller 
nations, the weaker nations, those na-
tions that are emerging or want to 
emerge from a colonial status, or those 
nations that have felt, as some Latin 
American countries have for many 
years, that they were under the pressure 
of the stronger powers, especially the 
United States. These slogans are appeal-
ing, and they are appealing to men and 
women of good will in the world every-
where. They sound so nice. 
Now here again, of course, it would 
be false to say that the use of legal 
doctrines as slogans for propaganda pur-
poses is something which the Soviet 
Union invented. Of course, such use 
existed to some degree before the Soviet 
Union was ever heard of. Nevertheless, 
the manipulation of high-sounding inter-
national law doctrines as propaganda 
slogans has reached new heights in 
Soviet practice. As symbols of rectitude, 
these are slogans which stir up the 
emotions by making it appear somehow 
that the Soviet Union is on the side of 
the angels, the side of good. To knowl-
edgeable and unprejudiced observers, 
this manipulation has appeared particu-
larly blatant and cynical, especially 
when we consider such slogans as inter-
vention and self-determination. What 
about Hungary? And Hungary is only 
one of the most obvious examples of 
the Soviet disregard of these very princi-
ples, as today, of course, the United 
States has tried to make quite clear. 
What about Soviet behavior in Ger-
many? Is it consonant with the principle 
of self-determination? And so it goes. 
There is quite a gap between Soviet 
words and Soviet actions. 
There's another Soviet trait in the 
area of international law which I think 
also should be kept in mind on the level 
of action-that the Soviet Union has 
almost invariably rejected any proposal, 
any institution, that provides for third 
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party adjudication, or third party settle-
ment of disputes. It has not submitted 
any of its disputes to the International 
Court of Justice, for instance, or to 
arbitration, except some very minor 
commercial disputes. We have time and 
again proposed to them to submit, for 
instance, our claims for our aircraft shot 
down by Soviet forces, the latest ex-
ample being the RB-47, to adjudication 
by the International Court of Justice, 
but they have consistently refused to do 
so. And again this is not inconsistent 
with their basic outlook on the world; it 
is, as a matter of fact, quite consistent, 
because, they say, in the relations be-
tween capitalist and communist theory, 
who can be impartial? The International 
Court of Justice, they say, is loaded 
with capitalists. A large majority are 
capitalist lawyers. An international 
court, of course, decides by majority; 
there is no veto in it. There is no rule of 
unanimity. In another area, we see this 
quite clearly today in Soviet proposals 
concerning the reorganization of the 
United Nations on a so-called tripartite 
basis, the Soviet bloc, the Western bloc, 
and the uncommitted countries being 
the three parts, each of which would 
have in effect a veto power which the 
Soviets already enjoy in the Security 
Council as we do; but this would 
amount to veto power in the General 
Assembly where today there is no rule 
of unanimity, a two-thirds majority 
being sufficient to pass a resolution on 
questions of importance. 
But perhaps the greatest difference 
between the Soviet and the Western 
worlds in relation to international law-
the difference which perhaps is of most 
significance in terms of universality of 
international law-is the difference on 
the third level which I mentioned, 
namely, that of motivation. Now, here 
again let me point out that I am not 
claiming that differences in motivation 
with respect to the observance of inter-
national law have not existed and do 
not exist among the noncommunist 
countries. Of course, they do. As a 
matter of fact, this is an area in which 
further studies are needed to shed more 
light on why certain countries and 
governments in certain situations ob-
serve international law while others do 
not, and what are the attitudes toward 
the observance of international law by 
what my friend Professor McDougal has 
called the governing elites of various 
nations-the decision-makers, as well as 
the masses. All of this is an area which 
has not been properly studied, but when 
we look at Soviet ideology we find 
certain peculiar aspects which find no 
counterpart in the Western world. What 
arc these? Here again I must digress into 
the more general field of Soviet ideology. 
Basic in the Soviet interpretation of 
history is the doctrine of the class 
struggle. History is viewed as a product 
of the class struggle. Now what does 
class struggle mean? They believe that 
all modern societies are governed by a 
particular social class and that in all 
so-called capitalist countries the govern-
ment is in the hands of the capitalists, 
that is, the owners of the means of 
production-shareholders of industries 
and managers of industries who exploit 
the workmen; and for this purpose-the 
purpose of assuring this exploitation-
were created institutions of private 
property and law. Law is not used as an 
impartial system of justice; it is used as 
an instrument of the policy of the ruling 
class. They say, furthermore, that there 
is a basic, insurmountable antagonism 
between the interests of the exploiting 
class, the capitalists, and the interests of 
the proletariat, the workmen, which 
permits of no basic reconciliation. The 
only way that change can be brought 
about is to overthrow the rule of the 
capitalists and to substitute for it gov-
ernment by the workers, who thereby 
become the ruling class, and, of course, 
the communists are regarded as leaders 
of the working class. And so there are 
two kinds of states in the world today, 
those ruled by the capitalists, and those 
ruled by the workers and led by the 
Communist Party. 
Now these two kinds of states both 
have their own separate systems of law. 
In each kind of state the law is an 
instrument of the particular ruling class 
and is directed primarily at the other 
ruling class, to suppress it and exploit it, 
or else, as in the case of the working 
class, to root out the remnants of 
capitalism and to maintain the power of 
the Soviet state. Now, if that is true, 
then how can there be a universal 
international law? It would be either an 
instrument of the policies of the capital-
ists or an instrument of the policies of 
the working class led by the Communist 
Party, but how can there be a single 
international law which will represent 
thc interests of both? 
This is a theoretical problem which 
has given them continual trouble, and 
they arc still writing articles trying to 
make suggestions why this is possible, 
how to havc a universal single interna-
tional law despite differences in the 
class basis of the two systems. But 
whatever may be the theoretical diffi-
culties, the basic ideology is to regard 
law as an instrument of the ruling class 
and to look forward to a Utopian time 
in the future whcre all law would 
disappear in a classless society, where all 
organized coercion by the state would 
be abolished and people would live in 
sweetness and peace without law. That's 
the Utopian vision. In the meantime, 
however, there is this struggle going on 
between the capitalists and the workers 
-a worldwide struggle. Ultimately the 
workers are going to win-this has been 
historically determined, according to 
the communists. But as long as this 
struggle lasts, there may be temporary 
accommodation necessary. This is what 
they call the period of transition, and 
this temporary accommodation may 
well call for peaceful relations with the 
capitalist states, an avoidance of ex-
treme friction which might lead to war 
which they don't want to see at this 
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particular time because they may be too 
weak or because the war may be too 
destructive. For these purposes, interna-
tional law is accepted as an instrument 
to make possible this temporary co-
existence in the period of transition. 
But, eventually, of course, they believe 
that they will win, and that this tem-
porary accommodation is not going to 
be lasting. 
Now what is the meaning of this? 
The meaning for motivation of interna-
tional law observance is that they do 
not believe that international law is part 
of a system, a continuing system of 
stability in international relations. There 
is no real community of interest be-
tween communist and noncommunist 
states, according to their doctrine. The 
two worlds are inescapably hostile to 
each other. Now, there is a difference 
between that and the traditional West-
ern acceptance of the system of states as 
an essentially permanent, stable system. 
That doesn't mean that it's unchange-
able, but it is a system which we don't 
expect to disappear in the very near 
future as a result of our subverting it. 
For hundreds of years a certain system 
has existed and has come to be accepted 
as stable and, though subject to change, 
not subject to violent destruction in the 
near future. This gives, in the West, a 
different perspective on the observance 
of international law. When you believe 
the system is stable, you attach more 
importance to such matters as good 
faith, stability, reciprocity, considera-
tions of confidence, value of property-
what you do today may influence 
action toward you ten or twenty years 
from now. These elements are much 
weaker in the Soviet attitude toward 
international law because the Soviets 
reject the very idea of lasting accom-
modation and a single world system, 
and therefore while they accept interna-
tional law as an instrument, and a very 
useful instrument, to prevent the more 
acute friction with the capitalist world, 
they also view international law, as I 
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pointed out, as a set of slogans which 
can be used in a way which is hostile to 
the existing system, although the slo-
gans themselves as properly interpreted 
and applied are not. 
Now, these two uses of international 
law, the propaganda use on the one 
hand, and the actual observance of 
international law on the other, are basic 
and have been basic in the history of the 
Soviet Union. This reality must be 
always kept in mind. International law 
wiII be observed because it suits the 
Soviet Union for certain purposes at 
certain times, but it also wiII be used to 
attack the West at its weakest points 
psychologically by propaganda. It wiII 
also be used in some situations where 
the West puts too much trust in the 
observance of international law by the 
Soviet Union; such trust may be, of 
course, unwise. 
I may also point out that there are 
certain characteristics of the Soviet 
system of society, apart from ideology, 
which also make for differences in the 
attitude toward international law. The 
Western society in which international 
law has developed over the centuries has 
been a pluralistic one. There are many 
private interests, especially business and 
commercial interests, which have found 
in international law-certain parts of 
it-valuable protection of their business 
enterprises, etc. And more generally, in 
a pluralistic society, lawyers appear as 
spokesmen for particular group inter-
ests-spokesmen who emphasize the im-
portance of the maintenance of law as 
well as its development, and who there-
by bring about by their actions, their 
sayings, and their influence in govern-
ment, a general law habit into being; 
that is, the habit of thinking of govern-
mental matters in terms of legality or 
law rather than sheer power and ex-
pediency. In the Soviet system, there is 
no pluralistic group arrangement of this 
kind. Everything is subordinated to the 
hierarchy's decision as to what is good 
for the system and society. As a matter 
of fact, lawyers as a profession have 
very little influence in the Soviet Union 
and have a very unimportant standing in 
society. If there is trouble with the 
government, of course, a lawyer nor-
mally does try to help his client, but in 
the area which is very important in the 
West, namely, civil law, there is very 
little for lawyers to do in the Soviet 
Union. Of course, there are enterprises 
which have lawyers writing contracts 
with other enterprises and that sort of 
thing, but this is of very minor im-
portance compared with the role of 
lawyers in our highly industrialized, but 
still basically private enterprise, society. 
In the United States there are some 
250,000 practicing lawyers. In the 
Soviet Union I don't think there arc 
more than 10,000; but it is not only a 
matter of numbers, it is also the matter 
of their standing in society-their rela-
tion to the decision-making process. In 
other words, in the Soviet Union the 
law and the lawyer are in a much 
weaker position than they are in the 
West to influence the attitudes of the 
governing elite or the decision-makers, 
and this extends to international law 
because the law habits which have been 
developed in our domestic concerns and 
domestic society are psychologically apt 
to be carried over into the international 
field, and it is perhaps no historical 
accident that the United States and 
Great Britain-where, especially in the 
United States, lawyers have been promi-
nent in domestic politics and domestic 
government-historically have stressed 
international law in international affairs. 
The Soviet concept of morality also 
is ideologically different from ours; here 
you might say that I am exaggerating, 
hut I'm not. The Soviet writers are quite 
clear on this-in the period of struggle 
against capitalism, the highest morality 
means doing everything to help com-
munism win, since communism is the 
great hope of humanity's future. Any-
thing that helps the victory of com-
munism is moral and vice versa. 
Now, here again there seems to be no 
room for a feeling of moral obligation 
to obey international law. I am not 
saying that in the United States, or in 
the West in general, a feeling of moral 
obligation is necessarily the most im-
portant reason why international law is 
observed. Undoubtedly considerations 
of expediency do enter into it in a very 
large degree, but in the West, again, in a 
pluralistic society, there are some 
people at least who feel it is morally bad 
to break the law. In the Soviet Union 
this would be, with respect to interna-
tional law, difficult to justify as logical 
and unlikely to find proper expression, 
although it may be privately felt. Of 
course, there is another difference-here 
in the West, or at least in the United 
States, we have freedom of expression, 
which means that when the government 
does something which is questionable 
from the standpoint of international law 
or morality, there are people who may 
criticize the government and criticize it 
openly in the press and public state-
ments. In the Soviet Union this is never 
done. You can't find a single Soviet 
writing on international law or interna-
tional politics in which it is admitted 
that the Soviet Union has ever violated 
international law. This is not true in the 
United States. You do find writings, 
quite a few of them, pointing to certain 
violations of international law by the 
United States; but not in the Soviet 
Union. 
Well, now what are to be our conclu-
sions? There are areas in which there are 
certain accommodations, even a certain 
measure of cooperation (for instance, in 
the conservation of fisheries) between 
the communist and the noncommunist 
world. It's possible and apparently 
desirable for both, so long as the 
policies of both sides call for the con-
tinuance of relations on a basis short of 
all-out war, for international law to have 
a part to play. Treaties have been made 
and continue to be made between the 
two sides. They may be relied upon so 
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long as the observance of such treaties is 
of mutual advantage. Of course, it 
would be nonsense to rely on treaties 
which the Soviet Union had signed and 
which it feels it is no longer in its 
interest to observe. This is a matter of 
careful diplomacy, of course: To reach 
accommodations and to formalize these 
accommodations in treaties, in such a 
way that the observance and continual 
existence of the accommodations and 
the observance of the terms of the 
accommodations as expressed in treaties 
will be to the advantage of both sides. 
What about the prospects? Well, it 
seems to me that the basic communist 
attitudes toward society, history and 
international law, are not going to 
change overnight. As a matter of fact, 
the new draft program of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union which 
was published some weeks ago, is ample 
proof that the basic ideology remains 
unchanged, and perhaps even becomes 
more militant in certain ways. From a 
longer range point of view, predictions 
of course are difficult, but it seems to 
me that the outcome in this, as in many 
other fields, will depend on the balance 
of power between the two sides, and by 
power I do not mean just military 
power although I include it, but also 
economic power and power over public 
opinion. If the noncommunist world 
remains strong in relation to the com-
munist world, economically, socially, as 
well as militarily, as generations pass, 
and as Soviet society assumes a more 
stable form, perhaps the ideology will 
gradually be eroded and the Soviets will 
settle down in their ways, and there 
may be a gradual softening of the 
hostility of the Soviet leaders t0ward 
the outside world, and therefore a 
greater appreciation of the long-run 
advantages of international law. In other 
words, a stable balance of power will 
create expectations of continued sta-
bility and therefore of continuing 
advantages of legal regulation of the 
relations between the two sides. If, on 
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the other hand, the Soviet leaders have 
reason to feel that they are aboutto win, 
that the struggle is going their way, not 
necessari~y in a military fashion for the 
time heing, hut in other ways, that they 
are continually hecoming stronger eco-
nomically, continually expanding their 
influence in the gray areas of the world, 
then they will he confident-they will he 
reassured and reaffirmed in their ide-
ology, in their expectations of a complete 
triumph in a not-too-distant future. Un-
der those conditions they are not likely 
to attach too much importance to inter-
national law, hut on the contrary, will 
prohahly increase its function as a propa-
ganda tool, and at the same time use the 
doctrines I mentioned hefore, that as 
ohjective conditions change, interna-
tional ohligations hecome ohsolete. It is 
up to us, by maintaining our strength in 
all fields, to demonstrate the advantages, 
in the long run, of lasting accommoda-
tions, and eventually to bring ahout a 
greater degree of consensus between the 
two sides on what kind of regulation of 
their relations in legal terms is the most 
desirable. 
----tfi----
